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What is the impact of the exchange rate volatility on economic activity? This seems to be one of the 
most compelling questions in the economic literature in recent times, as the currency crisis during 
the 90´s were characterized not only by massive exchange rate depreciations but also by a drastic 
drop in economic activity and the collapse of the financial system. The more striking characteristics 
of these currency crisis were that, previous to the crisis themselves, the degree of exchange rate 
misalignment was considered small, and the standard macroeconomic fundamentals were 
considered sound (in terms of inflation, fiscal deficit, monetary expansion, among other variables).   
 
On the theoretical side, a large body of literature is being developed around the “open economy 
Bernanke-Gertler” framework (a phrase coined by Krugman), which refers to the inclusion of some 
sort of imperfection in the domestic financial market within an standard model of open economy, 
along the lines of the Mundell-Fleming workhorse. In this type of models, if there exists a 
significant currency mismatch in the economy
1, a large devaluation will deteriorate the firm’s net 
worth. As the firm’s risk increases, credit becomes more expensive and more restricted, which 
finally affects investment and therefore, aggregate demand. Therefore the key variable in explaining 
the contractionary effects of a real exchange rate depreciation is the currency mismatch in the 
economy. Using this balance-sheet channel, Krugman (1999) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee 
(2000) present models with multiple equilibrium. This feature is needed to explain large 
depreciations without significant changes in macroeconomic fundamentals.   
 
Besides the balance sheet channel, there are two other direct channels by which the exchange rate 
affects economic activity. First, a real depreciation increases the cost of imported inputs, which can 
be seen as a negative supply shock by the firms. This channel reinforces the balance sheet one, and 
there is ample evidence in the literature about the way it operates. See for example Edwards (1989), 
Agenor and Montiel (1996) and more recently Reif (2001).  
 
                                                 
1 A currency mismatch means that a large fraction of firm’s debt is dollar denominated while the flow of 
income as well as assets are mostly denominated in domestic currency.  
  3Second, a real depreciation can have expansionary effects through increasing the operating profits 
in the export sector, as well as increasing the cost of the imported final goods. Whether or not the 
competitiveness effect offsets the other two negative effects is an empirical question for which the 
evidence is not conclusive. On one hand, for example, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) found evidence 
that the competitiveness effect is much stronger than the balance-sheet effect, using a sample of 
enterprises from several Latin-American countries. On the other hand, Aguiar (2002) studied the 
case of Mexican firms, finding that, after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, there was a contraction on 
investment driven by the weak balance sheet position of the firms.  
 
Given that this empirical issue is not resolved yet, the final answer heavily depends on the debt 
composition and the output orientation of the firm, as well as the macroeconomic characteristic of 
the country. In this paper we study the case of Peru and try to find out an empirical answer to the 
question posed at the very beginning of this paper. 
 
The Peruvian case is particularly interesting because it did not experienced a traumatic depreciation, 
as the ones experienced by Asian or other Latin-American countries. On the contrary, by most 
standards a real depreciation of almost 20 % in a one year period (March-98 to March-99) can be 
considered normal or even small. However, such a small depreciation had  strong negative effects 
on the internal Peruvian demand, as aggregate investment plummeted. Moreover, the economy 
remained in recession for a long time and, by the end of 2002, private investment had not yet 
recovered its previous level, hovering around 2/3 of the levels reached at the end of 1997. 
 
To understand the behavior of the Peruvian economy, we develop a two-step strategy. First, at the 
macroeconomic level, we use an unrestricted VAR to analyze the response of GDP to real exchange 
rate variation, taking into account a differentiation of output by primary and non-primary sectors. At 
this level, we found that the strengthen of the balance sheet effect is reinforced by a different 
channel, a bank-lending channel. This mechanism operates through the synchronization between 
bank-lending standards and the business cycle
2.  
 
Second, at the microeconomic level, we estimate the final impact of exchange rate variation on 
investments and sales with accounting data from 163 Peruvian firms for the period 1994-2000. We 
find evidence that, in the Peruvian economy, the balance sheet effect more than compensated the 
                                                 
2 For the case of US economy see Asea and Blomberg (1998). 
 
  4competitiveness effect, both at the aggregate and at the firm level. Also, firm level evidence 
supports the findings that aggregate credit conditions are important to determine firm’s investment 
decisions.  
 
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, this is a case in which a small real exchange rate 
depreciation triggers a large balance-sheet effect. Second, we found evidence that, as the banks’ net 
worth deteriorates, credit conditions became more strict; therefore, the balance sheet effect is 
reinforced by  a bank-lending channel. This finding is crucial because in the literature the role of 
banks has been either overlooked or not well addressed.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the macroeconomic 
conditions in Peru during the 90s. In the third section a partial equilibrium model of investment 
decisions under borrowing constraints is presented. The description of the firm level data is made in 
the fourth section and the econometric results are presented in the fifth section. Finally, some policy 
recommendations are discussed in the conclusions.  
 
II.  A Macroeconomic Perspective  
 
A.  The Peruvian Economy in the 90s 
 
Economic developments in Peru during the early 90s illustrate one of the most remarkable cases of 
structural reforms and serve as an example of economic growth with macroeconomic adjustment. 
At the end of 1990, the Peruvian economy was in a critical condition: the inflation rate exceeded 
7,600 %, fiscal deficit reached 7,8 % of GDP, public external debt was around 63 % of GDP, and in 
such a deteriorated macroeconomic environment, the GDP shrank by 5,1 %. 
 
By the end of 1997, a new economic scenario had emerged. A combination of prudent 
macroeconomic policies and an aggressive program of structural reforms was applied, yielding an 
impressive economic recovery. The average GDP growth rate during the post-adjustment period 
(1993-1997) reached 7 %, inflation rate converged to a one digit figure; investment, as well as 
savings, went from 16,5 % and 11,8 % of GDP in 1990 to 24,6 % and 19,4 % of GDP in 1997, 
respectively. But the most impressive performance took place on the fiscal side: by 1997 the 
Peruvian economy experienced a modest fiscal surplus (0,2 % of GDP) for the first time in more 
than two decades. 
  5 
This performance was achieved at expenses of incurring in severe macroeconomic risks, as some of 




•  A low level of internal savings. Since the total savings in the economy did not grew at the 
same pace as investment, external savings were needed to finance GDP growth. As a result, 
current account deficits were high and increasing (see Figure A1.1). 
•  A highly concentration of exports. Four commodities (gold, copper, fishmeal and zinc) 
represent more than 50 % of total exports (see Table A1.1).  
•  A loss of confidence in the domestic currency. Due to the hyperinflation in the 80´s, the 
domestic currency was replaced by the US dollar in several functions, specially as a store of 
value. Therefore, as people saved in dollar denominated accounts, commercial banks also 
lent in US dollars, transferring the exchange rate risk to  lenders (see Figure A1.2). 
 
The macroeconomic weaknesses explained the fragility in the financial system: 
 
•  The dollarization of the financial system. By the end of 1997, the commercial banking 
system was highly dollarized. Deposits in dollars were 74 % of total deposits, while credit 
in dollars represented 75 % of total credit (see Figure A1.3). 
•  A high exposure to short-term capital inflows. The financial system used short-term credit 
lines form foreign banks to increase its loanable funds. In just three and a half years, from 
1994 to June 1998, the short-term foreign liabilities of the commercial banking grew by 830 
%, reaching US$ 3,701 millions, which represented more than 25 % of total banking credit 
(see Figure A1.4). 
•  The short-term maturity of banking credit. By the end of 1999, the banking credit with 
maturity less than one month was higher than 25 % of the total credit and for credits with 
maturity less than one year the percentage reached almost 65 %.    
 
These structural characteristics of the Peruvian economy explained the long lasting effects of the 
liquidity crisis of 1998, which resulted from the contagion of the Russian crisis. Therefore, by the 
end of 1998, the macroeconomic picture was quite different. After the international liquidity 
contraction and the real depreciation of the currency, the Peruvian economy suffered a severe 
  6downturn in investment, aggregate demand, and output. There are four characteristics of this 
recession that should be emphasized: 
 
•  First, the contraction in aggregate production was asymmetric: on one hand, the domestic 
market-oriented firms were severely affected by the plummeting of the internal demand, but 
on the other hand, the export-oriented firms performed relatively well, avoiding a deeper 
recession. 
 
•  Second, the economic recession is still in place after almost four years and the standard 
measures to restore internal demand have failed. In fact, monetary and fiscal policies have 
been ineffective to impulse internal demand in a sustainable manner.  
 
•  Third, the recession negatively affected the quality of banks’ assets. The non-performing 
loans doubled in a few months and have remained high since then. A severe credit crunch 
followed immediately after the real depreciation and the credit remained restricted since 
then, even when access to international credit markets were restored and domestic banks 
were quite liquid. 
 
•  Fourth, asset prices and firms’ benefits declined in the aftermath of the crisis and have 
remained weak until 2002. 
  
B. Econometric  evidence 
 
How important was the real exchange rate depreciation to explain these results? What were the 
main transmission mechanisms in the Peruvian experience? To answer these questions at an 
aggregate level, we use an unrestricted VAR model with six endogenous variables: an index of real 
non-primary GDP (1994=100), the ratio of non-performing loans, banking credit to private sector 
(in US dollars), real exchange rate index (1994=100), a measure of international liquidity (given by 
the external credit lines of commercial banks in US dollars), and an index of real primary GDP 
(1994=100)
4. As all these variables were I(1), the series were filtered using Hodrick-Prescott 
                                                                                                                                                     
3 Some graphs are presented in Appendix 1. 
4 Primary GDP is the flow of output coming from primary productive sectors, such as agriculture, fishing and 
mining, as well manufacturing activities related to such sectors (for example, fishmeal). 
  7technique and the model was estimated for the transitory components
5. The results does not change 
if we estimated the model using the first differences of the series.  
 
The order of the variables reflects the degree of endogeneity, being the real primary GDP the most 
exogenous. Other variables such as the stock market index or the domestic interest rates, among 
others, are excluded because they showed no significance. On the other hand, we include some 
control variables such as terms of trade, the international interest rate, a dummy variable for 
political turmoil, another dummy variable to account for “El Niño”, and finally a dummy variable to 
reflect the government’s program to support the banking sector at the end of 1999, exchanging 
nonperforming loans with Treasury Bonds. The model is estimated using monthly data from the 
period January 1992-January 2003. 
 
From the impulse response function, we can draw some conclusions
6: 
 
•  Regarding a positive shock in international liquidity: 
o There will be a positive impact on economic activity. After the shock occurs, non-
primary real GDP starts to increase immediately and to decline afterwards. The 
initial impact is the only one that is significant. On the other hand, the impact on 
primary GDP is not significant as mining projects are more related to foreign direct 
investment than short-term capital inflows.   
o A period of real exchange rate appreciation follows, reaching the peak at the third 
month, and then it becomes not significant. 
o The impact on banking credit will also be positive, but short lived; while there is no 
significant impact on nonperforming loans.  
 
•  Regarding the exchange rate, after a real depreciation: 
o There is a strong contraction of economic activity, measured by non-primary GDP, 
starting almost immediately and reaching the lowest point at the second month, 
whereas there is no significant evidence of a positive  competitiveness effect on the 
primary GDP sector. 
                                                 
5 As expected the transitory components of the series are I(0). 
6 The impulse-response functions are presented in Appendix 2. 
  8o There is a rapid increase in nonperforming loans, reaching its peak at the fifth 
month. It should be noticed that only in this period the impact is statistically 
significant. 
o Finally, the banking credit to the private sector declines, in part explained by the 
higher credit risk. 
 
These results obtained at an aggregate level show that the real exchange depreciation affects 
negatively economic activity, evidencing that the balance-sheet effect is stronger than the 
competitiveness effect. Moreover, as the export sector is a supply-driven sector, at least in the short 
run, we find evidence of an statistically insignificant competitiveness effect, as primary GDP does 
not strongly  react to real exchange rate variations. 
 
Moreover, we have found evidence that the balance sheet effect is reinforced by a bank-lending 
channel, which is associated with the change experienced in the banks behavior when 
macroeconomic conditions deteriorate. As nonperforming loans increase, banking credit to the 
private sector declines, which in turn affects economic activity. In fact, the existence of a 
relationship between bank-lending standards and aggregate fluctuations helps to explain the 
amplification and propagation of the business cycle. 
  
In addition, it should be noticed that we did not find evidence that the financial cost channel 
(reflected by a higher interest rates in the economy) and the asset-price channel (reflected by a fall 
in the stock market index) were empirically significant to explain the output dynamics in the 
economy.  
 
III. Theoretical  Framework 
 
In this section we present a very simple, partial equilibrium model of firm’s profit maximization. 
We will use this model in order to understand how variations of the real exchange rate, as well as of 
the interest rate, affect firm’s investment decisions. 
 
Our model follows closely the model by Bleakly and Cowan (2002), but there are two important 
differences. First, we take a different approach to model credit market imperfections and the way in 
which the net worth channel works. In their paper, changes in the firm’s net worth negatively affect 
the interest rate at which the firm is borrowing (price channel), that is,  







W r  
 where r is the gross interest rate and W is the firm’s net worth. 
 
On the contrary, in our model, changes in the net worth affect the borrowing constraint, limiting the 
amount of credit available to the firm (quantity channel), while the interest rate is affected by 
aggregate liquidity conditions.  The reason to do this is that the credit imperfections are due to an 
enforcement problem, as lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debt, but they can seize a 
fraction ￿ of the borrower’s final net worth. In this respect the amount of credit cannot be greater 
than the firm’s enforceable net worth, that is, 
 
rL < ￿W 
 
where L is the loan. This approach is more in line with the new developments in financial theory 
that start with the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and has been followed very recently by 
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001), among others.  Also, as it has been discussed in previous 
sections, this approach is more relevant for the Peruvian case where, after the shock, the interest 
rate came down quickly but credit remained sluggish up to the first half of 2002, almost four years 
after the liquidity crisis. 
 
Second, in our model we take into account the difference between short term and long term 
borrowing, as excessive short term exposure can trigger a liquidity crisis even for a healthy and 
financially sound firm. 
 
A. The  Model 
 
In this model there are two periods. Firms enter into the first period with some level and some 
composition of debt. That is, we take as given the level of total indebtedness of the firm as well as 
the currency and the maturity composition of such debt. For simplicity we assume that the real 
exchange rate at which the debt was contracted was equal to one and no variation was anticipated.  
During the first period, after a real exchange rate devaluation occurs, firms have to make investment 
decisions (Kt+1) taking into account a budget constraint and a borrowing constraint, that is, 
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where  et+1 is the expected real exchange rate in second period; L* and L are the long term 
borrowing in foreign and domestic currency contracted before the devaluation took place and 
payable in the last period; S* and S are the short term borrowing in foreign and domestic currency 
contracted at the first period and payable at the last period; V* and V are the net cash position in 
foreign and domestic currency at the first period, which can be positive (net liabilities due in the 
first period) or negative (positive net current assets).  
 
Moreover, g(et+1) = (￿et+1+(1-￿)) is the implicit unit price of the firm, where ￿ is the fraction of 
exported production. In our model, F(Kt+1) should be taken as output net of input, including 
imports, therefore ￿ is the net-export coefficient in the price function.  
 
Notice that in this definition g(·) does not depend on the firm’s debt composition as in Bleakley and 
Cowan. Also, we assume that et+1 = ￿(et), with  









e µ  
 
Equation (2) is the budget constraint, which it will be assumed to hold with equality and in which 
the capital goods are all imported; while equation (3) is the borrowing constraint. If the borrowing 
constraint is binding, the investment decision will be suboptimal because the capital demand 
function will depend on the firm’s net worth. If the borrowing constraint is not binding, the capital 
demand function will be unrestricted. In other words, variations in the real exchange rate will have 
different impacts on the firm’s investment decisions, not only depending on the degree of 
tradable/non tradable production (given by ￿) or the degree of currency composition but also on the 
net worth position of the firm. 
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Assuming that the currency composition of the debt is not a decision variable, but rather it is taken 
as given
7 (in particular we will assume for simplicity that all short-term debt is denominated in 
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Notice that the currency and maturity composition of the outstanding net liabilities (L, L*, V and 
V*) at the time of depreciation are crucial in the sense that large depreciations can deteriorate the 
financial position of firms that are heavily indebted in foreign currency and, at the time, trigger a 
liquidity crisis.   
 
B.  Investment decisions for small (undercapitalized) firms 
 
Given that the small (undercapitalized) firms will be credit constrained, the choice of Kt+1 depends 
on the credit availability rather that on the optimality conditions. Therefore, as we can see in Figure 
1, Kt+1 will be determined by replacing restriction (5) in (6): 
() t t t t t t
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[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Taking implicit derivatives with respect to Kt+1 and et, we obtain equation (8): 
 
                                                 
7 Notice that once the exchange rate depreciation has been observed, the currency composition of new short 
term debt is irrelevant for the investment decision given that, by the interest parity condition:  
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It is not clear the sign of the right-hand side of this last equation. Given that the interest rate is 
higher than the marginal productivity (assumption of small firm), our concern is the sign of the 
expression inside the parenthesis, where we can find three types of mechanisms: 
 
1.  A competitiveness effect. A higher exchange rate will imply a higher implicit unit price if 
the firm is in the export sector.  This effect is given by the expression: 
 
) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 + + t t t K F e e g µ  > 0     (9) 
 
2.  A traditional financial cost effect. It has its origin in the higher financial payments (interest 
rate plus amortization) that have to be satisfied due to the exchange rate depreciation. This 
effect could be positive if the firms buy foreign capital with capital borrowed in domestic 
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3.  The balance-sheet effect. Which comes from the fact that a higher exchange rate reduces 
the borrowing capacity of the firm, given that the debt is in foreign currency. This effect is 
given by:  
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It should be noticed that what matters for the competitive effect is the level of the real exchange 
rate, whereas the real exchange rate variation is the relevant variable for both the financial cost and 
the balance-sheet effects. 
 
If the competitive effect is stronger than the financial and balance sheet effects, a real exchange rate 
depreciation will have a positive impact on investment. In Figure 2 this can be seen as an outward 
  13movement of the G-curve. In case of a highly indebted firm, a strong negative balance sheet effect 
could produce the financial collapse as the G-curve would never intersect the I-curve, as depicted in 
Figure 3.   
 
[FIGURES  2 and 3 HERE] 
 
C.  Investment decisions for large (well capitalized) firms 
 
In the case of large and well capitalized firms, the balance sheet effect tends to be diluted, as the 
access to borrowing is not constrained. In this case, firms will maximize equation (1) subject to the 
budget constraint only (equation 2). Assuming that the composition of short-term debt is not a 
choice and that ￿ represents the fraction of dollar debt to total debt, the optimality condition for 
such problem becomes: 
 
0 ) ) 1 ( ( ) ( ' ) (
*
1 1 1 = − + − + + + t s s t t t e r r e K F e g β β      (12) 
 
which is the standard optimality condition: marginal product equals to average interest rate, taking 
exchange rate and outstanding debt as given. Now, taking implicit derivatives with respect to Kt+1 
and et, we obtain: 
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The impact of exchange rate variations on the value of outstanding debt will be important only in 
terms of changes in the net worth but, as we are dealing with large firms, investment decisions will 
exclusively depend on next-period expected marginal returns, which are not related to the firm’s net 
worth. As the denominator will always be negative, the sign of equation (13) depends on the sign of 
the numerator which, in turn, depends on the relative values of ￿ and ￿.   
 
This relationship is represented in Figure 4. In the shadowed area, the competitiveness effect is 
stronger than the financial effect. Remember that there is not balance sheet effect. It is clear that, 
when ￿ = ￿ = 1, the impact of an exchange rate depreciation on investment is null because the 
optimality condition remains unchanged, while when ￿ = ￿ =0, the numerator of (13) is positive 
and equal to rs.  
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IV. The  Data 
A.  On the data collection 
 
Our database consists of firm-level accounting information for 163 non-financial Peruvian firms 
from 1994 to 2001. It may seem somehow disappointing that our database only registers 163 
firms for the panel data analysis. In fact, our initial purpose was to obtain a much bigger 
database, but we gradually learnt that obtaining reliable financial information at the firm level 
in Peru was a real Herculean task. Hence, we will try to explain the main problems we had to 
deal with along the data gathering process, problems that finally forced us to rely on this 
relatively small sample.  
 
•  Delay in the sign of the Confidentiality Agreement 
First of all, we were required to sign a Confidentiality Agreement with the Comisión Nacional 
Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV) in order to have access to the data at the firm 
level. CONASEV is supposed to have all the relevant financial information of the 218 firms 
that are listed in the Bolsa de Valores de Lima (Lima Stock Exchange) and of some additional 
3,000 firms not listed. We faced our first obstacle at the time of signing the Agreement. It was 
severely delayed because of internal problems in CONASEV. We finally signed the Agreement 
by the end of October, 2002. 
 
•  Incomplete and unprocessed information 
CONASEV presents in its web site the financial statements and its financial notes, for the 218 
firms listed for years 1996 to 2001
8. The 2001 data is complete as it contains the financial 
statements and notes for the 218 firms. Once we started going back in time, several problems 
with the information started to show up. The financial notes are present only in 50 % of the 
firms for the 2000 data and they are almost completely absent in the 1996-99 data.  
 
The data from 1994 to 1998 have not been processed by CONASEV yet and hence, we had to 
start an archeological work at the physical archives of the entity. We had to manually copy 
down the data on paper from the archives and then put that information in our database. The 
                                                 
8 Note that 218 is the current number of firms listed at the BVL, but there used to be a larger number of listed 
firms in past years. Due to several bankruptcies and mergers, this number has been reduced.   
  15data at the physical archives is filed in boxes and the employees at CONASEV helped us 
indicating the place of every firm and year. However, there seems to be holes in the CONASEV 
database system as their officers were unable to indicate us the precise places of the financial 
information in different years. In many other cases, they were surprised as it became clear that 
some firms had not fulfilled the obligation to present their financial data or that the information 
has simply disappeared . 
 
•  Non consecutive data 
CONASEV sent us a list of some 800 firms that were not publicly traded at the BVL for which 
this entity had financial information for the years 1994-96 (of course, in physical archives). 
When we revised the data looking for firms that showed data for these three years, we only 
found one (1) firm that fulfilled this condition. This episode describes the kind of problems with 
firm level data that we encountered. Considering the scarcity of information, we were forced to 
accept firms with at least three consecutive data entries. Being more strict would have 
eliminated even more observations from our panel data analysis. 
 
•  Poor quality of data 
The main quality problems that appeared when gathering the financial data were the following: 
a)  Absence of Financial Notes. The Notes are fundamental because only there we can find 
crucial information such as the debt breakdown, number of workers and exports ratio. 
However, in many cases we were unable to find the Financial Notes at the CONASEV 
archives.  
b)  Heterogeneous data. Not every Note contains the same information. For example, there 
were a lot of cases in which the firms do not state their debt currency composition but only 
their net dollar position. Some Notes state the exports ratio, others do not.  
c)  Poor data quality. In many cases, we were forced to eliminate firms because of the poor 
quality of their information. For example, we found discrepancies between the Balance 
Sheet and the Notes, such as fractions that surpassed totals (i.e. Dollar Debt Ratios superior 
to 100%). In other cases, we eliminated firms that registered extreme volatility in their debt 
or investment ratios, since we found these swings to be unlikely. 
 
Hence, once we eliminated the financial and insurance firms from the CONASEV database, 
those firms that had less than three consecutive years of data and those firms with unusual 
  16volatility in their ratios, we obtained a final database for econometric purposes that contains 
information for 163 firms. 
 
Finally, it is of paramount importance to note that the task of gathering financial data at the firm 
level in order to analyze their debt composition or their investment decision making is a pioneer 
work in Peru as there are no previous studies to base upon. The officers of CONASEV 
confirmed us that it was the very first time that any researcher is allowed to have access to their 
physical archives. Our obstacles and difficulties to obtain abundant and reliable data show the 
troubles faced by every researcher that tries to do empirical work in countries with weak 
institutionalism like Peru. 
 
B.  Description of the Data 
 
Our sample of 163 firms has the following characteristics: 
 
  Manufacturing   ⇒  87 firms (53%) 
  Agriculture   ⇒  10 firms  (6%) 
  Commerce   ⇒    4 firms  (2%) 
  Construction   ⇒    3 firms  (2%) 
  Mining   ⇒  25 firms (15%) 
  Fishing   ⇒    3 firms  (2%) 
  Services   ⇒  31 firms (19%) 
 
We identified 125 firms as operating in the “tradable” sector and 38 firms as operating in the 
“non-tradable” sector depending on their specific activity. Consequently, these 38 non-tradable 
firms are the ones corresponding to the Services, Construction and Commerce activities. 
 
Considering year 2001 as a reference, we observed that for that year the average size of the 
firms across the sample was 470,1 millions of soles (measured as total assets) with a standard 
deviation of  1.094,1 millions.
9 A majority of the firms, 81 %, were under the mean while only 
21 % of the firms were considered “large” as they were above the mean. On the other hand, the 
median of the size distribution was 140,8 millions of soles. Note that the mean is almost three 
  17times the median so an important bias can arise if we consider “large” only the ones above the 
average line. So, in our analysis we will consider “large” firms those above the median line. 
 
Our main goal was to determine if firms improve their economic condition in the aftermath of a 
currency devaluation or not, so we needed to have a measure of that outcome. Bleakley and 
Cowan (2002)
10 identify the firms’ “condition” with their investment expenditures. Here we 
followed the BC approach using the investment to capital ratio (Kt – Kt-1) / Kt-1 as our 
investment measure. Our definition of Kt  is only Gross Fixed Capital, so our investment 
variable does not include inventories investment but mostly machinery, equipment and 
construction.  
 
However, we considered that identifying the firms’ economic health only with investment 
expenditures is too restrictive. Thus, we evaluated if the currency devaluation can also have 
impact on firms sales. We eliminated scale problems by using a sales to assets ratio defined as 
Total Sales/Total Assets. 
 
To analyze the behavior of these two dependent variables (investment and sales ratios), we 
considered the following instruments as our benchmark regressors: 
 
  The dollar debt ratio as percentage of total debt (DME). This is a crucial variable as the 
balance sheet effect negatively impacts on the financial health of domestic firms 
through their dollar debt burden as an initial direct channel.  
 
  The short term liabilities ratio as percentage of total liabilities (PC). We wanted to 
evaluate if the term composition of debt is important to explain different firms behavior 
after real exchange adjustments. Moreover, if Peruvian firms are exposed to credit and 
liquidity constraints this variable can be useful to determine the firms creditworthiness 
and the banking behavior as well.  
 
  The real exchange rate can be measured by the bilateral real exchange rate (TCRB), 
which is the RER between the sol and the dollar adjusted for the inflation differential 
between Peru and USA. Or by the multilateral real exchange rate (TCRM) which is the 
                                                                                                                                                     
9 With a nominal exchange rate of 3,5 soles /dollar in 2001, this means that the average size of firms´ total 
assets was around US$ 134 million. 
  18RER between the sol and the currencies of our main trading partners, adjusting for the 
inflation differentials and weighing each currency by the specific importance of the 
corresponding country in the Peruvian international trade. This TCRM is calculated 
monthly by the Central Bank of Peru. Both definitions of RER are indexes with 1994 = 
100. Someone can ask why is this difference important? The answer is that the TCRB 
(bilateral) and the TCRM (multilateral) observed a quite different behavior in the 
period under study as shown in the following graphs. Take note that in the period 
between 1995 and 1998, while the multilateral RER was declining, the bilateral RER 
was increasing. After the sharp increase in the real exchange rate operated under both 
definitions in 1999, the behavior thereafter has been again distinct: the TCRM fell 
























  Real Gross Domestic Product (PBI). As a determinant of aggregate economic 
conditions. Index with 1994 = 100.  
 
  A political dummy (DPOLITIC). This dummy tries to capture the severe political 
instability occurred in Peru, crisis that began by mid-2000 with the fraudulent general 
election won by Alberto Fujimori and ended up with the final triumph of Alejandro 
Toledo in the presidential race of mid-2001. We consider that this episode in our recent 
history was so particular and challenging for the Peruvian society that ought to be 
considered when estimating economic behavior during this period. Hence, our political 
dummy values 1 in years 2000 and 2001, 0 in the rest. 
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10 BC henceforth  
  The average lending interest rate in dollars (TAMEX). As the dollar-denominated 
credit represented around three quarters of total banking credit during the period under 
study, the dollar lending rate is the proper rate to consider as the cost of capital for 
investors. 
 
  The real credit of the banking system to the private sector (CRSP) as a proxy of the 
general credit market conditions. In particular the credit availability that domestic firms 
face and the lending stance of the banking system. 
 
In Table 1 we present the main statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) of the firms 
variables of interest, i.e. dollar debt ratio, sales ratio, short term debt ratio and investment ratio. 
The dollar debt ratio (DME) observes an increasing pattern along the years of the sample with 
its mean starting at a level of  53,1% in 1994 and finishing at 63,3% in 2001 after a peak of 
67,7% in 1998 (pre-crisis year) while the median also increases from 53% to 71% in the same 
period. The sales/assets ratio shows on the contrary, a declining pattern with a mean of 97,0% 
in 1994 and an ending level of 68,5% after having fallen to its lowest level during years 1999 
and 2000, while its median also falls from 87,5% to 54%. The short term debt ratio (PC) 
registers a downward trend, starting at 74,6% in 1994 and ending the year 2001 at 61,6%, while 
the median observes the same pattern falling from 78% in 1994 to 57,5% in 2001. Note that 
both the dollar debt ratio (DME) and the short term debt ratio (PC) observe similar statistical 
characteristics at present: the DME ratio mean is 63 % and its standard deviation is 0,26 while 
the PC ratio mean is 62 % and its standard deviation is 0,28. Finally, we observe a dramatic fall 
in the investment ratio from a mean of 17,1 % in 1994 to a 2,3% level in 2001, slump that is 
shared by the median of the sample which falls from 5,6% to 1,0%. It is interesting to note that 
the investment downtrend turns into collapse from 1999 onwards. 
 
 






  20V. Econometric  Results 
 
A. Explaining  Debt  Composition 
 
What does it determine the debt composition of the Peruvian firms? Do large firms tend to have 
more dollar denominated debt than smaller firms? Do tradable sector firms exhibit more dollar 
debt compared to non tradable sector firms? These are the kind of questions we wanted to 
address regarding the debt composition of the Peruvian firms. For these purposes, one standard 
route is to perform a panel data analysis. However, we took two different routes: (i) we   
performed sequential cross section regressions and (ii) we made a panel data analysis.  
 
By making sequential cross section regressions we can capture eventual shifts or changes in the 
behavior of debt determinants than could remain hidden under a standard panel data analysis. 
So we performed two-variable cross section regressions for each year (1994-2001) trying to 
find statistical significance among regressors that would help to understand what determines: (i) 
the dollar debt ratio (DME), and (ii) the short term debt ratio (PC). Our possible explicatory 
variables were size, tradability and export potential. 
 
We measured size by the total assets that every firm registered each year. An important 
question is how to classify “large” and “small” as any distinction is clearly arbitrary. A line has 
to be drawn to determine whether firms are considered “large” or “small”. We drew the line 
considering the median of the size distribution because, as we mentioned before, the presence 
of a bunch of huge firms can bias the mean upwards, leaving an important amount of  large 
firms in the “small” group. Thus, we created a dummy variables for size that classifies “large” 
and “small” firms depending on whether they are above or under the median of the assets size 
distribution.  
 
The tradable/non tradable definition considers manufacturing, mining, agriculture and oil as 
tradable, while most services and construction are considered non tradable. In the case of 
export/non export, we could not find reliable information regarding the exports of every firm. In 
fact, that information was absent in most financial statements under review. So we applied the 
export ratio that the INEI (National Institute of Statistics) assigns in its input-output matrix.
11 
                                                 
11 This input-output matrix consigns export ratios for 45 economic sectors. The base year is 1994. 
  21Once every firm is mapped into the corresponding economic sector of the input-output matrix it 
assumes the corresponding export/total sales ratio.  
 
Table 2A shows the correlations for the dollar debt ratio from 1994 to 2001. The size dummy 
(median definition) shows no significance except in year 1995 (at a 10% level of significance) 
and year 1999. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the currency composition of the debt 
among Peruvian firms is independent of their size. It is also important to distinguish here a 
banking behavior behind this finding: creditors seem not to take into account the firms’ size 
when deciding to lend in soles or dollars.  
 
Do the tradable sector firms tend to have more dollar denominated debt than non tradable sector 
firms? We did not find any evidence that tradable sector firms have different debt composition 
than non tradable sector firms. In fact, the tradability coefficient lacks of significance for the 
whole period under study. 
  
However, when we tested the significance of the export dummy it became important from 1997 
onwards (except year 1999). Our hypothesis here is that after the Asian crisis, the banks seem to 
have modified its lending criteria favoring the export firms more than the rest. This fact appears 
to be contradictory with the tradable/non tradable story described above. However, we think 
that they are not necessarily in contradiction for the following two reasons: (i) export firms are 
only a small sub group of the tradable sector firms
12; and (ii) exporters are more immune to 
balance sheets effects as even tradable firms that operate in the domestic market would not have 
fully transferred exchange rate hikes to domestic prices. Hence, exporters seem to have gained 
creditworthiness since the inception of the Asian crisis. 
 
[TABLE 2A HERE] 
 
Table 2B shows the correlations for the short term debt ratio for the period 1994-2001. The first 
important conclusion is that larger firms tend to have lower short term ratios. In other words, 
there is a strong evidence that larger firms are the only ones that have access to longer term 
credits than smaller firms. This evidence is quite robust except for year 1999 that - as we 
mentioned before – was a very atypical year. The export potential variable is not significant for 
  22every year in the sample, while the “tradability” of the sector appears to be important from 1998 
onwards, i.e. after the Asian crisis. 
[TABLE 2B HERE] 
 
The panel data analysis is very consistent with our sequential cross section analysis. Table 3 
show the results of regressing Dollar Debt Ratio (DME) and Short Term Debt Ratio (PC) 
against a constant term, size dummy, tradable dummy and export ratio. In the DME equation 
shows that neither size nor tradability is statistically significant, but that exports ratio is positive 
and very significant. In the PC equation, size is negative and important reinforcing our previous 
finding that “larger” firms tend to have access to longer term credit. Tradability is also 
significative and positive which is consistent with our previous results. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
B.  Explaining Investment and Sales with Static Panel Data Analysis 
 
As we mentioned before, we focused on two types of measures of the “economic health” of 
firms to evaluate if they performed better or worse after a real exchange rate devaluation. First, 
we focused on investment in gross fixed capital relative to its previous level, i.e. Kt – Kt-1/Kt-1. 
In second place, we focused on sales measured as total sales/total assets. 
 
In this section we present the results of estimating fixed effects for the panel data, i.e. different 
intercepts for each pool member. The estimation method is feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) assuming the presence of heteroskedasticity which is a common feature in cross section 
analysis
13. The use of this method implies that each pool equation is downweighted by an 
estimate of the cross-section residual deviation. 
 
Investment Equations  
 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the negative effects on investment derived from holding dollar 
debt during a RER devaluation. The reason for considering the alternative RER definitions in 
                                                                                                                                                     
12 Note that exports represent only around 14 % of Peruvian GDP. The means of the export ratio within the 
sample were 16,7 % (2001), 16,4 % (2000), 15,9 % (1999), 15,5 % (1998), 15,7 % (1997), 14,8 % (1996), 
15,9 % (1995) and 15,5 % (1994). 
13 In fact, we found evidence of heteroskedasticity in the regressions of debt composition. 
  23levels and differences is that we wanted to test if multilateral real exchange rate is related more 
directly with competitiveness while the bilateral real exchange variation is more related with the 
problems arising from a dollar indebtedness (i.e. measuring balance sheet effect).
14  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Equation 1 is presented here just for the record as it is a rather poor regression. What it is 
important to note is that most signs are inverted compared with what we expected. In particular, 
it is quite surprising that the dollar debt ratio is positive (though not significant), the level of 
multilateral real exchange rate is negative denoting a negative competitiveness effect, the 
difference of the real exchange rate is positive denoting an anti-balance sheet effect and the 
GDP is negative which indicates a quite implausible countercyclical investment function. 
Finally, the political dummy has also an inverted sign as we would understand that during the 
chaotic years 2000 and 2001 investment fell – not rose – in response to the political instability. 
 
In Equations 2 and 3, we homogenized the definitions of the real exchange rates using both 
multilateral and bilateral RER for both levels and differences respectively. The results improve 
partially as the political dummy turns negative and significant while the competitiveness effect 
becomes non significant. What is noteworthy is that the difference of the real exchange rate in 
both specifications show a negative and significant coefficient indicating the existence of 
evidence of a negative balance sheet effect on investment. Finally, in both equations the 
political dummy turns negative and significant, while the lagged GDP shows no significance, in 
line with our expectations. 
 
Equations 4 and 5, present alternative definitions of the real exchange rate in both levels and 
differences, but also include a variable for the credit market conditions as measured by the real 
banking credit to the private sector (CRSP). This variable shows a positive sign as expected and 
it is significative at a 5 % level in both equations. The dollar debt ratio shows no evidence of 
significance except in Equation 4 (at a 10% level) and the sign remains inverted along the five 
equations. However, the difference of the RER, in particular in the bilateral case, shows a 
negative coefficient and signification at the 1% level (Equation 5) indicating that real 
                                                 
14 Recall that our theoretical model derives an expression for both the competitiveness effect and the balance 
sheet effect. The former depending on the level of the real exchange rate and the latter depending on the 
difference of the real exchange rate. 
  24devaluations tend to affect negatively the investment expenditures of firms which is very 
supportive of the BSE hypothesis.  
 
The next step was to include some interaction effects and non linearities into the investment 
specifications in order to replicate and to expand the Bleakley-Cowan analysis.  Bleakley and 
Cowan (2002) examined the behavior of corporate investment across 500 firms in five Latin 
America countries (none of them is Peru). The main question they try to answer is whether 
firms with more dollar debt invest less in the aftermath of a devaluation. To do so, the key 
variable in their analysis is (Dollar Debt)i,t-1 x (∆  ln Real Exchange Rate)t which they call the 
“interaction effect”. They decompose this interaction effect into two components that have 
opposite signs: (i) net worth channel and (ii) competitiveness channel. The sign of this 
“interaction effect” would depend on which channel dominates and the key determinant for that 
is how strongly the currency composition of debt is related to the exchange rate sensitivity of 
profits at the firm level. 
 
Their main empirical result is that the sign of this “interaction effect” is positive, i.e. firms 
holding dollar debt invest more than firms holding peso debt after a devaluation. They argue 
that this result is due to the match between the currency composition of their debt and the 
sensibility of their income to the real exchange rate. Accordingly, they argue that after a 
devaluation, earnings are higher in those firms holding more dollar debt. 
 
We wanted to replicate the basic features of the BC estimation with our database doing some 
adjustments and including additional controls. One important difference between the BC 
estimation and ours is that we do not derive any “interaction effect” to be estimated from our 
theoretical model. In the BC model the “interaction effect” arises from their definition of 
relative price
15 so that the relative price of output not only depends on the real exchange rate but 
also in the fraction of firm debt denominated in dollars (β ). On the contrary, in our model, the 
relative price depends only on the real exchange rate. Of course, in our model we do identify 
the elements of the competitiveness and the net-worth channels but they depend on the level 
and difference of the real exchange rate respectively. Another important difference is that the 
BC estimation presents fixed effects by countries while our estimates calculate one different 
intercept (fixed effects) for each firm. 
 
  25As we mentioned, the main finding of the BC paper is that the interaction of lagged dollar debt 
and the change in the real exchange rate (D*x ∆ e) is positive and significant. Hence, they 
conclude that firms that hold dollar debt during a devaluation actually go on to substantially 
increase their investment (in both fixed capital and inventories) relative to peso-indebted firms 
and consequently, they do not find any evidence of the detrimental effect of the exchange rate 
on investment that balance sheet effect models predict. 
 
It is important to take into account that BC argue that this positive effect of real exchange rate 
adjustments is due to the degree of match between currency composition of debt and the 
elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. In fact, they mentioned that in their sample, 
dollarization of liabilities was higher in firms whose income was expected to be more positively 
correlated with the real exchange rate: firms in the tradable sector. On the contrary, in our 
sample we found that the dollar composition of debt showed no difference (at least statistically) 
among firms in the tradable or non-tradable sectors (see our Table 2). This feature is a key 
ingredient for explaining our divergent results. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Table 5 shows the results of replicating the BC basic equation with our adjustments and 
extensions. Equation 1 is quite similar to the baseline equation of the BC paper. We find a 
positive “interaction effect” just as BC did but in our case it lacks of significance.  Unlike them, 
we also find strong negative effects of both the dollar debt ratio and the difference in the real 
exchange rate. The magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the detrimental effects of dollar 
debt ratio and RER surpass way long the positive effect of (D*x  ∆ e). Finally, the total 
indebtedness ratio shows no significance. 
 
Equation 2 includes two controls: lagged GDP and the political dummy variable which has 
proven to be crucial to explain investment in our sample. These inclusions do not alter the basic 
findings of above: positive interaction effect (significant at a 10% level) that is completely 
outweighed by the dollar debt ratio and the difference in the real exchange rate, both significant 
at the 1% level. The political dummy shows strong negative effects and the lagged GDP 
surprisingly shows a negative and significant coefficient. Finally, the real banking credit to the 
private sector has positive sign and shows significance at the 10% level. 
                                                                                                                                                     
15 See equation 1 in Bleakley and Cowan (2002). 
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In equations 3 and 4, we include the interaction effect, dollar debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
RER level and differences and political dummy, differing in the inclusion or not of the lagged 
GDP. Both equations are very supportive of the BSE hypothesis. First of all, the dollar debt 
ratio shows strong negative effects on investment, in both cases the coefficients are significant 
at 5% level at least. Second, the difference of the RER shows a very strong negative and 
significative effect on firms’ investment, which is quite opposed to the BC study. Third, the 
“interaction effect” shows a positive and significant coefficient (as in the BC study), but the 
negative effects of both the dollar debt ratio and the difference in RER offset this timid positive 
effect.  Note that the level of the real exchange rate shows a positive coefficient (just as our 
theoretical model predicts) but is non significant. On the other hand, the political dummy is 
negative and significant as we expected, and the lagged GDP coefficients present mixed signs 
and lack of significance. Finally, the short term debt ratio shows a positive sign and statistical 
significance at the 1% level in both specifications, what can appear to be surprising at first sight 
but we think that it reflects the liquidity conditions in the credit market. 
 
Equations 5 and 6 include non linearities for the RER variations. It is quite plausible that 
investment decisions not only depend negatively on real exchange volatility but also that the 
influence of this volatility is non linear, meaning that if RER depreciation exceeds some critical 
levels its effects on investments are magnified. Thus, we included a non linear multilateral RER 
variable, defined as the squared D(TCRM). Non linear RER volatility shows strong negative 
effects in both specifications and at a 1% level of statistical significance. The interaction effect  
is still positive but lacks of significance. On the contrary, both equations are again, quite 
supportive of the BSE. The dollar debt ratio shows negative and very significant coefficients. 
The political dummy is negative and significant as before, while the short term debt ratio 
remains positive and significant. The inclusion of lagged GDP shows no significance.
16  
 
Finally, we constructed an “interaction effect” for the non linear RER volatility which is 
defined as (∆
2e x D*)
17.  Equation 7 shows that this interaction effects portrays a negative 
coefficient at 5% significance level while the main findings remain the same: negative and 
significant dollar debt ratio coefficient, positive and significant short term debt effect, positive 
                                                 
16 We did not include any difference of RER variable in these equations, as the “interaction effect” already 
includes D(TCRB) and we can loose degrees of freedom including excessive macroeconomic variables. 
17 We defined this variable as [DTCRM^2*DME(-1)] 
  27but non significant RER level (the competitiveness channel in our theoretical model), negative 
and significant at the 10% level coefficient of the difference of multilateral RER and very 
strong evidence of the negative effects of political instability on investment. It is noteworthy 
that in Equation 7, the GDP shows a significant positive coefficient, in line with a plausible 
procyclical investment function.   
 
In Equation 8, we included the real banking credit to the private sector (CRSP) which had 
shown pretty good adjustment in former specifications. In this case, CRSP again showed a 
positive and significant value while the non linear interaction effect remained negative but non 
significative. Equation 8 is again very supportive of our balance sheet effect (BSE) hypothesis 
as both the dollar debt ratio and the difference of RER show negative coefficients, both 
significant a the 1% level. The competitiveness channel seems positive and statistically 
significant but is largely compensated by the negative BSE exerted from the RER depreciation 
and the dollar debt burden. 
 
Equations 9 to 12 include “interaction effect” terms that try to capture the effects of interest rate 
volatility on invest. Hence, for Equations 9 and 10, we constructed an interaction term defined 
as (TAMEX x D*(-1)) that should capture the effects of interest rate volatility through the dollar 
denominated indebtedness. As we expected, this effect showed negative coefficients and 
became significative at the 5% level when real credit was included (Equation 10). It is 
noteworthy that the main features of the former equations remain intact: positive interaction 
effect (BC definition) counterbalanced by the negative balance sheet effect evidence derived 
from both the dollar debt ratio and the difference of the RER, and negative and significant 
political dummy. 
 
Equations 11 and 12 include a second interest rate volatility interaction effect, this time trying 
to capture the effects of interest rate volatility through the short term debt ratio. Hence, we 
constructed an interaction term defined as (TAMEX x PC(-1)). In principle, one would expect 
that the larger the short term debt ratio, the larger the negative impact of interest rate volatility 
on investment. However, Equations 11 and 12 show strong evidence on the contrary. This 
interaction effect shows a positive sign when tested alone (Equation 11) while the rest of 
variables keep their former signs and significance. It is very interesting to check what happened 
when we joined both “interest rate volatility interaction effects” in the same specification. The 
  28(TAMEX*DME-1) variable keeps a negative sign but lacks of significance. On the other hand, 
the (TAMEX*PC-1) variable shows a positive sign and it significative at the 5% level.  
 
How can we explain this astonishing result? The answer is liquidity constraint. We must 
interpret the first interaction term as capturing the compound effect of interest rate volatility and 
indebtedness, consequently it embodies the increasing financial costs linked to leveraging. On 
the other hand, we must comprehend the second interaction term as capturing the compound 
effect of interest rate volatility and short term indebtedness in a liquidity constrained 
environment.  Recall that most of the credit in Peru is short term credit. In fact, by 1999 
estimates 90% of total credit of the banking system had one year or less maturity. The yield 
curve virtually collapsed to the short end of the curve, in particular after the Asian crisis.   
Hence, a firm that showed increasing short term debt ratio was plausibly taking fresh resources, 
while firms that showed declining short term debt ratio was probably repaying debt and 
suffering working capital scarcity. In consequence, this second interaction term captures that 
liquidity constrained economy in which the firms that had access to fresh debt were the only 
ones able to invest in new capital formation; the key ingredient is that most of that new 
indebtedness was short term credit. 
 
Finally, we tested if “tradability”, exports and size were important factors explaining the 
investment function in our sample. Our tests showed that neither tradability (that is, whether the 
firm is operating in a tradable sector) nor exports were relevant. However, the size was positive 
and significant (equation 13) indicating that large firms tend to invest more than smaller firms. 
When including a interaction term for size [Size dummy x TCRM], this effect maintained its 
positive sign and statistical significance as shown in equation 14. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that after analyzing different investment specifications we found 
robust evidence of the following features: 
 
  A negative and significative effect of the firms’ dollar debt ratio. This evidence is very 
supportive of our BSE hypothesis. Firms that show higher levels of dollar denominated 
debt to total debt tend to reduce investments after a devaluation in comparison with 
firms that show higher levels of soles denominated debt. 
 
  29  A negative and significative effect of the variation of the real exchange rate on 
investment. This finding is clearly in line with the our theoretical model developed 
above and this coefficient is – again - very supportive of a negative balance sheet effect 
and congruent with the credit constraints that firms would face after a real devaluation. 
 
  The competitiveness effect seems to be positive as our theoretical model establishes, 
but lacks of statistical significance in most specifications. When the competitiveness 
effect is defined as an “interaction effect” (D*x ∆ e) in line with Bleakley and Cowan 
(2002), it shows - in general – small positive coefficients and seem not to be 
statistically robust. In any case, our results show that the negative effects of both the 
RER depreciation and the dollar debt burden largely counterweigh this positive 
competitiveness effect. 
 
  Real exchange rate volatility seems to portray non linear influence on investment 
decisions. It is quite plausible that investors not only observe the variations in RER, but 
that when this volatility exceeds some critical limits the “animal sprits” seem to panic 
and to postpone their investment decisions, probably due to their difficulties to evaluate 
projects in an accurate manner under severe RER volatility.  
 
  A negative and significative effect of the political instability on investment. This 
feature is consistent with modern theories of investment that not only take into account 
the economic environment but political and juridical stability as well. Considering that 
in many specifications the investment function seems to be countercyclical, the 
inclusion of this variable is crucial to explain the plummeting investment ratios in years 
of a still growing economy. 
 
  A positive and significative effect of the credit availability. This finding is consistent 
with the fact that Peruvian firms tend to finance their investment projects based on 
financial leverage more than in their own savings or earnings. Hence, it is quite logical 
that the general availability of credit shows explanatory power. 
 
  We found strong evidence that  the short term debt ratio is positive and significant, 
which would indicate that a higher short term leverage indicator can improve firms’ 
creditworthiness. A possible explanation can be derived from D.W. Diamond’s paper 
  30on debt maturity composition. He claims that “good” firms borrow short term as a way 
to signalling that in fact they are “good” firms.
18 Another explanations is that it reflects 
a liquidity constrained economy in which only those firms that have access to fresh 
resources are able to invest, but theses fresh resources are mainly short term debt. 
 
  Interest rate volatility appears to have a mixed effect on investment. On one hand, 
interest rate volatility increases financial costs derived from leverage. On the other 
hand, interest rate volatility when compound with short term indebtedness displays a 
surprising positive and significative coefficient. Our explanation is related to the fact 
that most of the credit in Peru is short term credit. Hence, a firm that showed increasing 
short term debt ratio was plausibly taking fresh resources, while firms that showed 
declining short term debt ratio was probably repaying debt and suffering illiquidity. In 
consequence, this second positive effect seem to capture the fact that firms having 
access to (short term) fresh debt were more prone to invest in new capital formation.  
 




Table 6 presents nine different specifications for the sales ratio function. We want to draw 
attention to the extraordinary high R
2 statistics of these equations. We used the multilateral real 
exchange rate in levels and both the bilateral and multilateral real exchange rate in differences 
to address the competitiveness and the balance sheet effects respectively. Shifting real exchange 
definitions does not substantially alter the results. Another important feature is that in all these  
equations we used contemporary GDP as we consider that current economic conditions are 
important to explain current sales. Recall that in the above investment equations, we have used 
lagged GDP, as the investment function is intrinsically intertemporal. 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Equation 1 shows that every variable except the competitiveness effect of real exchange rate is 
significative at a 1% level. The dollar debt ratio is negative and significative indicating that 
                                                 
18 Diamond, D.W. (1991): “Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106, pp. 710-737. Harvard University, MIT Press. 
  31firms that hold a higher dollar denominated debt tend to suffer in their sales after a real 
exchange devaluation. The short term debt ratio also shows a positive and significative 
coefficient. The coefficient of D(TCRB) denotes a negative and strong balance sheet effect. The 
only surprising result is the inverted sign of GDP that would denote an unlikely countercyclical 
sales function.  This phenomenon is explained –as we mentioned before - by the fact that in the 
years of political turmoil, sales went down while GDP kept growing. Therefore, we included 
the political dummy in the second equation to capture this phenomenon. Hence, equation 2 
shares the basic features of the previous equation, but in this case the sign of GDP turns positive 
while the political dummy shows a negative and very significative coefficient. The other 
variables are strongly supportive of the balance sheet effect as the dollar debt ratio and the RER 
depreciation  both exert significant impact on firms’ sales. The competitiveness channel appears 
to be positive and the short term debt ratio remains positive and statistically significant. It is 
noteworthy that five of six variables are significant at the 1% level and each coefficient has 
proper signs. 
 
Equations 3 and 4, include “interaction effects” in the same definition of Bleakey-Cowan, i.e. 
(∆  RER x lagged DME) but only showed statistical significance in the first case with the RER 
volatility is referred to its multilateral definition. The main findings remain the same in both 
equations: negative and significant effect of dollar debt ratio (at 1% level), positive and 
significant coefficient of short term debt ratio (at 1% level), positive and significant effect of 
the level of real multilateral exchange rate (at 1% level), negative and significant effect of the 
RER depreciation in both multilateral and bilateral definitions (both at the 1% level) and 
negative and significant effect of political instability (at the 1% level). The current GDP 
coefficient shows an inverted negative sign and is also statistically significant a the 1% level 
(Equation 4). 
 
Equation 5 tests if the RER volatility shows evidence of non linearity as was found in the 
investment specifications. The squared depreciation of the multilateral RER showed to exert a 
negative impact on sales but its significance was only achieved at a 10% level. Equations 6 and 
7, constructed an “interaction effect” of this squared depreciation multiplied by the lagged 
dollar debt ratio (DME–1). The results are not supportive of a significant “interaction effect” of 
this non linearity. But take note of the robustness of the signs and statistical significance of the 
main variables: dollar debt ratio, short term ratio, multilateral RER in level, difference of the 
RER in both definitions (multilateral and bilateral as well), GDP and political dummy. In fact, 
  32every single coefficient of equations 6 and 7 is significant at the 1% level, and everyone with 
exception of GDP has the expected sign. 
 
In Equations 8 and 9 we included the interactions effects of interest rate volatility explained 
before. Again, the variable (TAMEX x DME-1) showed a negative sign but was non significant. 
The other interest rate volatility interaction term (TAMEX x PC-1) showed a positive sign as in 
the investment specifications but in this case, its coefficient was not statistically different from 
zero.  
 
Finally, we tested if “tradability”, exports and size were important factors explaining the sales 
function in our sample. As before, our tests showed that neither tradability nor exports were 
relevant (we do not exhibit these results). However, the size (median definition) was negative 
and significant (equation 10) indicating that smaller firms tend to sell more than larger firms. 
When including a interaction term for size [Size dummy x TCRM], this effect maintained its 
negative sign and statistical significance as shown in equation 11.  
 
In light of the previous results, we can conclude that we have found robust evidence of the 
following effects in the sales equations: 
 
  A strong negative effect of the dollar debt ratio. Thus, firms with higher dollar debt to 
total debt ratio tend to observe lower sales after devaluations. This evidence is 
supportive of a BSE on sales. 
 
  A positive competitiveness effect of the real exchange rate. Even though we have not 
derived a theoretical framework for sales, we can employ the same logic behind the 
competitiveness channel for investment, i.e. firms would observe their sales to benefit 
from a higher RER level through a demand shift from imported goods to domestic 
goods (in the case of tradable firms) and from a reduction in domestic costs compared 
to incomes (in the cases of exporters). 
 
  A negative effect of the variation of the real exchange rate on sales. Note that the 
coefficients of D(TCRB) and D(TCRM) exceed the RER level coefficient. Hence, we 
found strong evidence of a negative balance sheet effect that largely counterbalances 
the positive competitiveness effect in sales.  
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  A positive effect of the short term debt ratio. This finding would reflect the fact that 
firms tend to increase sales when they have access to more short term credit (i.e. 
working capital). In other words, more liquid firms tend to sell more as a percentage of 
their assets. Under a banking perspective, this coefficient can reflect that banks tend to 
lend in shorter tenures to those firms that exhibit higher sales rotation.  
 
  A negative effect of the political instability on sales. This clearly indicates that firms 
sales were severely affected during that period of political instability. The procyclical 
behavior of sales weakens once we control by the political dummy. 
 
  We found only weak evidence of the negative effects of non linearities in the RER 
devaluations on sales. This contrasts with the strong evidence found in the investment 
equations. 
 
  Interest rate volatility does not appear to have significant effects on firms sales. Again, 
it contrasts with the supportive evidence of liquidity /credit constraints found in the 
investment equations. 
 
  Size matter but in a rather counterintuitive manner. Our evidence suggest that smaller 
firms sell more (as an asset ratio) than larger firms. This effect is opposite with the size 
effect on the investment equations. 
 
In sum, having evaluated the investment and sales behavior of the firms in our sample, we 
found robust evidence of a negative balance sheet effect (BSE) of currency volatility in both 
functions. This evidence is so robust that appears no matter what different channel or 
specification of this BSE we include in our tests (∆  RER, Dollar Debt Ratio or both compound).  
The real exchange rate volatility has shown bold impacts on investment and sales in different 
specifications (multilateral and bilateral), and there is some evidence regarding non linearity in 
these impacts, in particular in the investment case. Theses BSE effects counterbalance any 
eventual positive competitiveness effect, whether included in direct form or as an “interactive 
effect”.  Finally, we found that the positive effects of short term debt ratio on investment and 
sales is consistent with a liquidity/credit constrained economy, evidence that is ratified when 
compound with interest rate volatility. 
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As we mentioned before, the main finding of the BC paper is that firms that hold dollar debt 
during a devaluation actually go on to substantially increase their investment (in both fixed 
capital and inventories) relative to peso-indebted firms and consequently, they do not find any 
evidence of the detrimental effect of the exchange rate on investment that balance sheet effect 
models predict.  They argue that this positive effect of real exchange rate adjustments is due to 
the degree of match between currency composition of debt and the elasticity of their income to 
the exchange rate. In fact, dollarization of liabilities in their sample was higher in firms whose 
income was expected to be more positively correlated with the real exchange rate, i.e. firms in 
the tradable sector. On the contrary, in our sample we found that the dollar composition of debt 
showed no difference (at least statistically) among firms in the tradable or non-tradable sectors 
so we conclude that this feature is a key ingredient for explaining our divergent results. 
 
C.  Explaining Investment and Sales with Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
 
In this section we introduce a dynamic specification in our investment and sales model, adding 
lagged values of both dependent variables. Due to the biases arising from fixed effects 
estimation in small samples when lagged values of the dependent variable are included
19, our 
approach consists in applying the GMM method first proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
20.  
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19 This problem was first addressed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). They suggested including further lags of 
the difference of the dependent variable to instrument the lagged dependent variables included in a dynamic 
panel data model after the random effects had been removed by first differencing. 
20 The Arellano and Bond estimator relies on the GMM framework proposed by Hansen (1982). In particular, 
it is based on taking first differences to the dynamic equation with the objective of eliminating the specific 
firm effects (random effect), using lagged first differences of the dependent variable and lags of levels and 
exogenous variables as instruments. However, the weakness of the instruments employed is a major concern 
in estimating the parameters (Arellano and Bover, 1995). For more details, see Baltagi (2001) and Greene 
(2003). 
21 Data availability is an obstacle to include more lags.   
  35where  represents the first lag of the dependent variable,  is a matrix of strictly 
exogenous variables up to lag “k” and  is a matrix of time-specific common macroeconomic 
variables (such as GDP or exchange rate).  





To contrast the findings obtained in the static case, we applied the specification in (2) to 
equations 3 and 5 from Table 4 and equations and all the equations shown in Table 5, except 
equations 1, 2 and 7. The results obtained by the Arellano and Bond estimators are shown in 






Equations 3a and 5a from Table 7 shows no influence of past values of investment in actual 
values of this variable. However, we find a counterintuitive positive influence of dollar debt on 
investment. Also, in equation 2a, 5a and 12a, the political dummy shows a negative sign. The 
lack of significance of the depreciation coefficients (measured by the difference in both 
multilateral and bilateral RER) show no influence of a balance sheet effect on investment
22. 
 
Table 8 reports the estimates of the dynamic specification of the investment equations, 
introducing interaction terms and nonlinearities. Again, lagged values of investment are not 
statistically different from zero. Equation 2a shows the negative influence of total liabilities on 
investment and supports the BSE hypothesis. We find that the main effects of currency 
depreciation arise after one year. Also, the coefficient of short term ratio are positive (equation 
3a). The same results are observed in equation 4a. 
 
Equation 8a exhibits a positive competitiveness effect on investment but this effect is largely 
counterbalanced by the balance sheet effect caught by the difference in the multilateral RER. 
Finally, equations 10a and 12a introduce interaction effects and nonlinearities. The volatility 
                                                 
22 These odd findings could be a byproduct of problems in the data. Besides the short time span of our panel 
database, we found some multicollinearity problems in preliminary estimations. 
  36effects of interest rates are highly significative (at 1% level). As in the static specification, we 
observe a positive interaction term, counterbalanced by the negative balance sheet effect 
evidence, and negative and significant political dummy. Finally, equation 12a shows evidence 
of a liquidity constraint, as the interaction coefficient of [TAMEX x Lagged Short Term Debt 
Ratio] is positive and significative. On the other hand, the coefficients of [TAMEX x Lagged 
Dollar Debt Ratio] are negative in equations 10a and 12a, but only in the former is statistically 
different from zero. 
 
In equations 13a and 14a, we tested if the firms’ size was still an important factor in a dynamic 
specification. In consistence with our previous results, the size dummy both alone and as an 
interaction effect with lagged dollar debt showed a positive and significant coefficient in both 
cases. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that in the dynamic panel data specification for investment there is 
evidence of the following features: 
 
  No inertia.  
  Positive effect of dollar debt ratio on investment. 
  Strong presence of  a negative balance sheet effect in the current year and after one year. 
  Influence of interest rate volatility on investment consistent with our prior credit constraint 
economy. 
  Significant political environment. 
  Positive effect of credit availability. 




We now apply the specification in (2) to equations 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 from Table 6. As the 
equations are estimated via GMM, the Wald test now indicates the joint significance of the 
estimated parameters. The main difference with the former sales equations (besides including 
the lagged value of the sales ratio) is the inclusion of lagged differences in multilateral or 
bilateral real exchange rate. 
 
[Table 9] 
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Equation 3a shows that the lagged sales parameter is significant at the 1% level, and the other 
parameters, except the interaction effect and the lagged difference in multilateral RER, are 
significant at the 5% or 10% level. The lagged sales parameter shows a coefficient of 0.45, 
which is consistent with the high persistence of past values in determining the actual sales ratio. 
As in equation 3, the coefficient signs show: a negative impact of the dollar debt ratio, a 
positive value of the short term debt ratio, and a strong impact of a currency depreciation on 
sales. Also, the coefficients of GDP and the political dummy show the expected signs. In the 
case of equation 4a, both the present and lagged values of the difference in bilateral RER 
present statistical significance. It is important to note that the magnitude of the present value of 
the depreciation is far larger (about four times more) than the lagged value. Also, the interaction 
effect is not statistically different from zero in both equations. 
 
Equations 6a and 7a include the real banking credit to the private sector as a regressor. The 
results show that the non linearity hypothesis (represented by the variable 
) cannot be accepted. However, the significance and signs of the other 
variables are quite important. The coefficients of the depreciation variable (bilateral and 
multilateral) show the expected sign and larger values than those present in the static 
specifications. In contrast to equation 6 and 7, these equations present a positive sign of the 
GDP coefficient. 
2 [( ) * ( 1 ) ] DT C R M D M E−
 
Equation 8a introduces the variableTA , which is statistically significant, with a 
negative sign. All of the other variables have the expected sign, although the dollar debt ratio 
was not significant. In equation 9a, the volatility interaction term  shows a 
negative sign but was not significant.  Finally, equations 10a and 11a test the importance of size 
in the sales behavior. As in the static specifications, we found that size is an significative 
variable and shows a negative coefficient, meaning that smaller firms tend to sell more than 
larger firms. 
1 * MEX DME−
1 * TAMEX PC−
 
To summarize, we can conclude that the dynamic specification has the following 
characteristics: 
 
  There is strong evidence that lagged sales have a substantial influence on present sales 
(about 50%). Hence, the sales function appears to exhibit a strong inertia. 
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  A negative effect of the dollar debt ratio though the results are not as strong as in the case 
of the static specification.  
 
  A positive competitiveness effect of the real exchange rate. However, the negative effect of 
the variation of the real exchange rate on sales, both in present and lagged values. As in the 
case of the static specifications, the negative effect of this variation exceeds the 
competitiveness effect. This is evidence of a Balance Sheet Effect. 
 
  A positive effect of the short term debt ratio consistent with previous evidence. As before, 
we believe that this fact is related to our credit constraint hypothesis. 
 
  A negative effect of the political instability on sales. The values obtained by this method 
exceed largely the ones obtained in the static specification. 
 
  The effect of nonlinearities on sales cannot be accepted. 
 
  Also, interest rate volatility exhibits weak effects on sales, especially in the case of total 
dollar debt. 
 




In this paper we found evidence that the balance sheet effect more than compensated the 
competitiveness effect in the Peruvian economy. The reasons behind these results are: (i) the 
high degree of liability dollarization and currency mismatch, (ii) the strong bank-lending 
channel that followed and reinforced the balance sheet effect and (iii) the relatively small and 
poor diversified export sector. 
 
What should be done before a crisis? On the structural side: (i) to increase the degree of 
openness of the real sector of the economy, which reduces the macroeconomic currency 
mismatch, (ii) to dedollarize the economy through prudential regulations (increasing general 
provisions for loans in dollars to the non tradable sector and increasing capital requirements 
  39depending on the degree of balance dollarization) and create an inflation-indexed saving 
instrument to replace the dollar in the store-of-value function, and (iii) on the prudential side, a 
procyclical provision could be a good way to smooth credit cycles out, so as to reduce excessive 
business fluctuations. 
 
What should be done in the aftermath  of a crisis? On the macroeconomic policy side, monetary 
policy should be as prudent as possible, taking into account that a period of banking illiquidity 
should be faced by the central bank. Domestic interest rate can go as high as needed to fight 
speculative attacks against the currency without no impact on the real sector, as long as short-
term debt in domestic currency is rather small. Regarding fiscal policy, it can be counter 
cyclical if public sector financial needs can be funded, otherwise it could be another source of 
instability (through deterioration of credibility). 
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Dollarization: Deposits in dollars 
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE STATISTICS
YEAR MEAN MEDIAN STD DEVIATION
1994 53.1% 53.0% 25.4%
1995 57.8% 62.3% 26.5%
1996 59.8% 62.3% 25.9%
1997 59.3% 62.8% 26.5%
1998 67.7% 74.1% 26.1%
1999 64.1% 72.3% 26.4%
2000 63.2% 66.9% 25.8%
2001 63.3% 71.0% 25.9%
YEAR MEAN MEDIAN STD DEVIATION
1994 97.0% 87.5% 57.6%
1995 90.9% 86.0% 50.8%
1996 82.8% 78.1% 51.4%
1997 78.2% 71.6% 50.7%
1998 70.2% 60.7% 51.2%
1999 66.1% 53.5% 48.5%
2000 67.4% 54.9% 49.5%
2001 68.5% 54.0% 51.5%
YEAR MEAN MEDIAN STD DEVIATION
1994 74.6% 78.0% 19.6%
1995 74.6% 78.3% 19.4%
1996 74.8% 76.8% 19.5%
1997 72.8% 76.7% 23.7%
1998 70.3% 72.2% 24.0%
1999 68.3% 71.0% 24.2%
2000 64.6% 63.7% 26.5%
2001 61.6% 57.5% 27.7%
YEAR MEAN MEDIAN STD DEVIATION
1994 17.1% 5.6% 35.2%
1995 9.2% 4.7% 17.9%
1996 8.5% 4.1% 23.8%
1997 12.5% 4.4% 33.1%
1998 11.2% 5.0% 31.4%
1999 6.9% 2.1% 30.8%
2000 3.2% 1.9% 25.4%
2001 2.3% 1.0% 23.5%
DOLLAR DEBT RATIO
SALES/ASSETS RATIO
SHORT TERM DEBT RATIO
INVESTMENT RATIO
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